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HABEAS CORPUS-DETERMINATION OF JURISDICTIONAL FACTS-
JUVENILE OFFENDERS.-The defendant was sentenced by the dis-
trict court to the state penitentiary for a period of from three
to nine years, upon her plea of guilty to an information charg-
ing her with manslaughter. Her counsel filed a motion to set
aside the sentence on the ground that she was under seventeen
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and
hence the court was without jurisdiction. The motion was over-
ruled and judgment was entered in which defendant was
declared to be eighteen years of age on her own admission.
Thereafter, counsel sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District
Court of the Parish of East Baton Rouge, which was denied.
Application for the writ was then made to the Supreme Court.
Held: writ granted and defendant released, subject to action by
the juvenile court. The sentence was void because defendant was
proved to be under seventeen years of age, hence the district
court was without jurisdiction ratione materiae. Objections to
jurisdiction may be raised by motion in arrest of judgment or
appeal, or may be raised by petition for writ of habeas corpus
irrespective of the fact that defendant might have secured relief
at a time in the past. State ex rel. Clayton v. Jones, 192 La. 671,
188 So. 737 (1939).
Although the result reached in this case is apparently a de-
sirable one, the court might more properly have founded its
decision upon the solicitous regard which the law manifests for
minors. The broad generalization employed-that exceptions to
the -jurisdiction ratione materiae are not waived by plea or going
to trial but may be raised by application for a writ of habeas
corpus-is open to criticism when applied to such situations as
here.
If properly understood, the rule is doubtlessly sound. In those
cases where the court which pronounces sentence is totally with-
out jurisdiction over the subject matter or the person, habeas
corpus is the obvious and proper remedy.' However, it is also
generally understood that a mere error or irregularity in the
1. Habeas corpus is an attack directly upon the validity of the judgment.
Ferris and Ferris, The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1926) 27.
On habeas corpus the court is concerned only with jurisdictional defects
which render the proceedings, not merely erroneous, but absolutely void.
Ferris and Ferris, op. cit. supra, at 36. State v. Louis, 152 La. 924, 94 So.
446 (1922); Ex parte State, 205 Ala. 677, 88 So. 899 (1921); Porter v. State,
62 Fla. 79, 56 So. 406 (1911); Thorp v. Smith, 64 Fla. 154, 59 So. 193 (1912);
Ex parte Davidson, 76 Fla. 272, 79 So. 727 (1918); Bowling Green v. Drake,
196 Ky. 114, 244 S.W. 318 (1922); Ex parte Burden, 92 Miss. 14, 45 So. 1 (1907);
Ex parte Lockhart, 72 Mont. 136, 232 Pac. 183 (1924); People v. Snell, 216
N.Y. 527, 111 N.E. 50 (1916).
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proceedings will not justify the issuance of the writ.2 In the latter
instance the defendant must proceed by way of appeal.
In attempting to distinguish want of jurisdiction from simple
error, much confusion is likely to result. If the court has general
jurisdiction over the offense charged and the person accused, any
error relating either to law or findings of fact should be regarded
simply for what they are, and the writ should be refused. More-
over, often the question as to whether the court has jurisdiction
over the offense or the person depends on a controverted ques-
tion of fact which must be determined after hearing. Since no
other tribunal is established by law to determine this preliminary
jurisdictional question, it follows that the same court which later
may assume jurisdiction to finally dispose of the case, is em-
powered by law to determine the facts upon which its jurisdiction
depends, although it may conclude that it cannot proceed further
with the case.3 These findings of fact may be made the object of
a preliminary finding, or may be fixed during the course of the
trial itself (particularly if the same facts which confer jurisdic-
tion are likewise important in determining the guilt of the party
on trial, as in cases involving a violation of the Mann Act). At
whatever stage these findings are made, they must be deemed
conclusive except as they are subject to the usual survey on
appeal. Otherwise the implied grant of power to the trial court
to make the determination serves no purpose.
The rule suggested above is followed by the federal courts, 4
2. Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 7 S.Ct. 780, 30 L. Ed. 824 (1887); Toy
Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L. Ed. 644 (1909); Harlan v.
McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 31 S.Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101 (1910); Charlton v. Kelly,
229 U.S. 447, 33 S.Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274 (1913);' Henry v. Henkel, 235 U.S.
219, 35 S.Ct. 54, 59 L.Ed. 203 (1914); State v. Fenderson, 28 La. Ann. 82
(1876); Ex parte Rhodes, 48 La. Ann. 1363, 20 So. 894 (1896); In re Courtney,
49 La. Ann. 685, 21 So. 729 (1897); Crooke v. Van Pelt, 76 Fla. 20, 79 So. 166
(1918); State v. Riley, 116 Minn. 1, 133 N.W. 86 (1911); State v. West, 139
Tenn. 522, 201 S.W. 743 (1918); Ex parte Riddle, 236 S.W. 725 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1921).
3. United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 27 S.Ct. 165, 51 L. Ed. 319 (1906);
Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L. Ed. 644 (1909). "Juris-
diction is not confined to cases in which the particular facts constitute a
good cause of action, or authorize, or require the court to exercise its juris-
diction to grant relief. . . . Jurisdiction is the power to decide wrongly as
well as rightly. Jurisdiction includes every issue, the issue of jurisdiction
as well as the issues on the merits within the scope of the general power
vested in the court by the law of its organization to deal with the abstract
question involved .. " Ferris and Ferris, op. cit. supra note 1, at 41.
This rule finds abundant support in civil cases where collateral attack
is made on the ground that the trial court was without jurisdiction: Elster
v. Picou, 144 La. 1052, 81 So. 710 (1919); Jefferson v. Gamm, 150 La. 312, 90
So. 682 (1922); Stephens v. Court of County Commissioners, 180 Ala. 531,
61 So. 917 (1913); Evansville Ry. Co. v. Evansville, 15 Ind. 395 (1860).
4. In a leading federal case the jurisdiction of the trial court depended
upon its finding that the defendant was an Indian and that the crime was
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which have repeatedly refused to allow the writ of habeas corpus
to perform the function of a writ of error in situations such as
the present.0 In at least one state the same rule was applied under
facts indistinguishable from those in the principal case.6 Nor is
there any peculiarity in the legislation or jurisprudence of Louisi-
ana requiring a different holding. Article 137 (1) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure provides that the writ of habeas corpus is
available if the court which ordered the defendant confined "has
exceeded its jurisdiction." The language of this Article is typical
of that found in the legislation of other jurisdictions. 7 The perti-
nent provisions of Article 822 of the Louisiana Code of Practice
are identical with those of the Code of Criminal Procedure.8 The
Supreme Court of Louisiana has declared that Article 822 in no
way enlarges the scope of the common law writ of habeas corpus?
Of the cases cited in the present decision only one involved the
writ of habeas corpus, and in that case the want of jurisdiction
was apparent on the face of the record. 10 In three other cases cited
the defendant had followed the proper course and appealed.1
W.J.B.
committed upon an Indian reservation. After the time for appeal had elapsed
defendant filed petition for habeas corpus. In denying the writ the Court said
that the trial court had properly exercised jurisdiction in disposing of the
preliminary inquiry, and refused to inquire whether the lower court had
correctly determined the facts. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 29 S.Ct.
416, 53 L. Ed. 644 (1909).
5. Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442, 31 S.Ct. 44, 54 L. Ed. 1101 (1910);
Matter of Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 31 S.Ct. 143, 55 L. Ed. 184 (1910); Glasgow
v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 32 S.Ct. 753, 56 L. Ed. 184 (1912); Goto v. Lane, 265
U.S. 393, 44 S.Ct. 525, 68 L. Ed. 1070 (1924); Knewell v. Egan, 268 U.S. 442,
45 S.Ct. 522, 69 L. Ed. 1036 (1925).
6. Ex parte Wallace, 75 Kans. 432, 89 Pac. 687 (1907). See also cases cited
supra, note 2.
7. See, for example, Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, 1928) § 4332: "If it appears
that the party is in custody, by virtue of process from any court legally
constituted . . . he can only be discharged.
"(1) Where the jurisdiction of such court has been exceeded, either as to
matter, place, sum, or person." This statute, as do the majority of state laws,
seems merely to codify the common law rule.
8. Art. 822, La. Code of Practice of 1870 provides: "If it appear to the
judge, from the return to the writ or from the accompanying documents, that
the party is confined by the order of some tribunal, he can only restore such
party to liberty in the following cases:
"(1) When such tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction, as defined by
law .... "
9. "The Code of Practice of this state adopts, in effect, at least (and
does not enlarge) in criminal cases, the functions of the most celebrated
writ in the English law and the constitutional writ in this country. . . . In
adopting the substance of the habeas corpus act, there is nothing in the
language of Article 822 of the Code of Practice denoting that it was ever
designed to trench upon the functions of other writs, or upon jurisdiction
on appeal." In re Courtney, 49 La. Ann. 685, 688, 21 So. 729, 730 (1897).
10. State v. Malone, 156 La. 617, 100 So. 788 (1924).
11. State v. Rose, 125 La. 1080, 52 So. 165 (1910); State v. Duckett, 160
La. 920, 107 So. 696 (1926); State v. Walker, 178 La. 635, 152 So. 315 (1933).
